Employment fluctuations are examined, at different levels of aggregation, in a dynamic model that provides firm-specific hiring decisions due to search frictions and sticky pricing. The results indicate that firm-level employment dispersion rises with higher price stickiness and higher demand elasticity, whereas it falls with more convexity of search costs and with a higher labor supply elasticity. Industry-level employment is more volatile and less procyclical than aggregate employment, and a larger industry size reduces volatility and raises co-movement with output.
Introduction
Search frictions and unemployment have been recently introduced in dynamic macroeconomic models that assume homogeneous employment in the labor market (Walsh, 2005; Trigari, 2009; Blanchard and Galí, 2010) . Such representative-agent models do not seem to be compatible with a search-andmatching theory of unemployment a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . Firm differentiation might * I would like to thank Javier Hualde, Ramón María-Dolores, Robert Shimer, Philipp Kircher, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. I also acknowledge financial support from the Spanish government (research project ECO2011-24304). E-mail: mcasares@unavarra.es (Miguel Casares) . Http://www.econ.unavarra.es/~mcasares/ . size. The results of this paper also show that industry-level employment volatility is more volatile and less procyclical than aggregate employment in both the calibrated model and US data.
However, the baseline model is not able to replicate the volatility gap because the standard deviation of industry-level employment is less than 10% higher than the standard deviation of aggregate employment, even in the case of a small industry size. Subsequently, the baseline model will be modified to incorporate firm-specific technology shocks as another source of firm heterogeneity. The simulation results will show that the calibrated model with idiosyncratic shocks is able to replicate the volatility, cyclical correlation and inertia observed in US industry-level employment fluctuations.
The rest of the paper contains four more sections. Section 2 describes the details and derivation of the baseline model and offers a calibration of its parameters. Section 3 examines the determinants of the volatility observed in firm-level employment fluctuations. Industry-level employment is defined in Section 4 and the effects of the industrial size on the second-moment statistics of employment fluctuations are examined in the baseline model and in one variant that incorporates firm-specific technology shocks. Section 5 reviews the main results.
A search-and-matching model with firm-specific employment
The supply-side of the economy is formed by monopolistically competitive firms of the type described in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Thus, firms may set a specific price while the amount of output produced is determined at the demand curve
where y t (i) is output produced at the representative firm i, P t (i)/P t is the ratio of price set by firm i over the aggregate price level, y t is aggregate output, and θ p > 0.0 is a constant elasticity parameter. In their production technology, firms have two forms of varying labor input: at the extensive margin (number of workers employed, n t (i)), and in the intensive margin (number of hours per worker demanded, h d t (i)). Assuming constant capital, and the same labor productivity in both margins, the production function of the i firm is
where 0 < α < 1, and z t denotes the economy-wide technology shock. After substituting (2) into
(1), the demand constraint faced by the i-th firm is exp(z t )h d t (i)n t (i)
Wages are adjusted by the firm to equate total hours of labor supply and labor demand. 4 . Hence, the nominal wage is the hourly rate that equates the willingness of workers to spend time at the firm (supply of total hours) with the need of workhours for the firm (demand for total hours). 5 For the specific i firm, the demand for total hours is obtained by turning (3) around to yield
Meanwhile, the supply of total hours is determined by solving the household optimizing program.
It is assumed that there is a representative large household as in Merz (1995) . The members of the household who are working pool their labor income to be split up evenly in a way that conveys consumption insurance for the unemployed members. The representative household demands bundles of differentiated consumption goods, c t , and supplies bundles of total hours of labor services, h s t n t .
Assuming constant elasticity of substitution á la Dixit-Stiglitz, the optimal allocation of total hours supplied to the i-th firm is positively related to the relative wage, W t (i)/W t , as follows
where θ w > 0 is the labor supply elasticity of substitution. 6 Using (4) and (5) to equate total hours supplied and demanded at firm i, h d t (i)n t (i) = h s t (i)n t (i), and solving for the labor-clearing nominal wage, W t (i), it is obtained 7
4 Alternatively, wages are defined in a Nash-style bargaining setup in many papers of the Mortensen-Pissarides literature (Walsh, 2005; Krause and Lubik, 2007; Christoffel and Kuester, 2008; and Trigari, 2009) . 5 The impossibility of instantaneous hiring obliges the firm to modify the amount of hours per worker, h d t (i), when output must be adjusted to meet current demand conditions. The other inputs of the production function (2) cannot be used to adjust the level of production because they are either exogenous (the technology shock, zt) or predetermined (employment, nt(i)). 6 See Casares (2007) for more details. 7 Casares (2008) defines the labor-clearing nominal wage for hours per worker, h which reveals that the nominal wage depends on the firm-specific price, affecting it negatively due to the reduction in the demand for total hours (4). The firm i will take into account this relationship between W t (i) and P t (i) in the optimizing program introduced below.
Next, let us describe the hiring decision. As in the search and matching literature (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) , hiring workers is costly for the firm. In particular, the firm must post a vacancy in the market and wait for a matching of that vacancy with some unemployed worker. The search cost of the i-th firm, c(v t (i)), is an increasing function of its number of vacancy postings, v t (i),
where c 0 > 0 is a scale parameter and c 1 ≥ 0 is the elasticity of the marginal cost of posting a vacancy with respect to the number of vacancies. The hiring process requires one period to fill the vacancy. Meanwhile, job destruction is determined by the constant separation rate, 0 < s < 1. 8 As a result, the employment accumulation equation for the i-th firm becomes
which implies that next period's employment is the predetermined sum of the jobs that remain after current period, (1 − s)n t (i), plus the number of new hirings, v t (i)q t , obtained as the product of the number of vacancies posted by the probability q t of filling them with a match. The matching probability is defined by the aggregate matching rate for vacancies
where m t is the total number of matchings. The matching technology, strictly bounded between 0 and 1, as recommended by Den Haan et al. (2000) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) , determines these matchings as follows
where ξ > 0 and u t = 1 − n t is the rate of unemployment.
The price setting decision of the firm is not separated from the hiring decision; both the price and next-period employment are jointly determined in the solution of its optimizing program. Thus, 8 Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) claim that the separation rate is quite stable in the US and has little effect on employment fluctuations.
the representative i firm seeks to maximize the intertemporal profit function
subject to constraints (3) and (7) in period t and future periods. Future profits are discounted at the stochastic discount factor β t,t+k for k = 1, 2, ..., ∞. The first order condition regarding the choice of next-period employment n t+1 (i) is
where ψ t+1 (i) and ϕ t (i) are the Lagrange multipliers respectively attached to constraints (3) in period t and (7) in their respective periods. The optimality condition on the demand for hours per worker,
where the partial derivative
n t (i) can be inserted in the last expression to identify ψ t (i) as the real marginal cost
Moving (9) one period ahead and using the result in (8) leads to
The interpretation of (10) can be done in microeconomic terms: the marginal benefit expected for a new job on the left-hand side (measured as the expected net saving of work hours to accommodate the new employee) must be equal to the marginal cost of creating a new job on the right-hand side.
The shadow value of a job for the firm, ϕ t (i), can be extracted from the first order condition on the number of vacancies posted in period t, v t (i), which says
defining ϕ t (i), as the marginal cost of vacancy posting divided by the probability of making a match
Prices are sticky. Following Calvo (1983) , there is a constant probability 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 that the firm is not able to set the optimal price. Supposing that the i firm receives the Calvo-type signal to price optimally, the first order condition that must satisfy is
where E η t is the rational expectation operator conditional to the lack of optimal pricing in future periods, and P * t (i) is the optimal price set in period t. The partial derivative implied by (6)
, the definition of the real marginal cost (9), and the demand constraint (1) can be used in the previous expression to reach
Equations (8) and (12) jointly determine the dynamic behavior of prices and employment. Loglinearizing techniques can be used to find linear approximations that explain the period-to-period evolution of these variables. Borrowing the standard notation, the hat symbol on top of a variable refers to the log deviation of that variable from its steady-state level. For example, n t = log nt n represents the log deviation of current aggregate employment, n t , from its steady state level, n. In addition, tilde-topped variables denote relative variables measured as log deviations with respect to the aggregate variable: the relative employment of firm i in period t is written as n t (i) = log
As shown in Appendix B, next period's relative employment, n t+1 (i), is inversely related to firm's expected relative price, P t (i). In addition, search costs justify some inertial pattern for employment accumulation that makes next period's hiring depend upon the current level of employment. Thus, relative employment dynamics are determined by the following log-linear expression
where the analytical solutions for τ 1 and τ 2 are
Meanwhile, the dynamic equation for aggregate employment fluctuations becomes 9
As a consequence of convex search costs, the fluctuation of next-period aggregation employment, n t+1 , depends on both its lag, n t , and its expected lead, E t n t+2 . It gives both backward-looking and forward-looking dynamics that smooth employment fluctuations. The stochastic discount factor, E t β t,t+1 , expected hours per worker, E t h t+1 , and the expected real wage, E t w t+1 , have also a positive influence on next-period employment; these three variables increase the expected marginal return of hirings at the firm level (see equation 10). In addition, the probability of a successful hiring, q t , has a positive effect on next-period employment. By contrast, next-period expected matching probability, E t q t+1 , has a negative impact on n t+1 because firms find less costly to postpone hirings for the future.
Also applying loglinearizing techniques, the pricing equation (12) leads to the inflation equation
which shows that inflation dynamics are driven by fluctuations of the real marginal cost, ψ t , with the standard forward-looking pattern of canonical New Keynesian models (Woodford, 2003, chapter 3).
The rest of the model is completed with a household instantaneous utility function, separable between consumption and total hours
and a standard household budget constraint as described in the optimizing program of Casares (2007) .
The labor supply equation is obtained when substituting the first order condition of consumption into the first order condition of the supply of total hours
Proof also available in Appendix B.
where 1 γ is the Frisch labor supply elasticity. In log-linear terms, the equilibrium real wage consistent with the labor supply schedule is
Combining first order conditions of consumption and bonds leads to the standard semi-loglinear IS curve
In addition, a Taylor-type monetary policy rule provides interest-rate reactions of the monetary authority to the current rate of inflation, µ π > 1.0, to the log change in output (proxy of the output gap), µ y > 0, featuring a component of interest-rate smoothing, 0 < µ R < 1 as follows
Other dynamic equations have been introduced above: log fluctuations of the aggregate real marginal cost from the aggregation of (9) across firms
log fluctuations of output around the steady-state level implied by the aggregation across firms of the production function (2)
log fluctuations of unemployment from the loglinearization of u t = 1 − n t
where n u is the employment-to-unemployment ratio in steady state; log fluctuations of aggregate vacancies obtained from the aggregation across firms of the loglinear version of (7)
log fluctuations of matchings obtained by taking logs and aggregating across firms on the matching
with the steady-state weights v ξ u ξ +v ξ and u ξ u ξ +v ξ ; the loglinear probability of posting a successful vacancy obtained from taking logs and aggregating across firms in the definition
the log-linearized overall resources constraint that includes the cost of vacancy postings
where c y and
are respectively the steady-state shares of consumption and search costs relative to output; and the definition of log deviations of the intertemporal discount factor
In summary, the macroeconomic model consists of thirteen equations, the set (15)- (27), that may provide solution paths for its thirteen endogenous variables:
m t , q t , and β t,t+1 . (Walsh 2005, Christoffel and Kuester, 2008) . As for the scale parameter, I set the value c 0 = 0.36 because it implies that search costs take 3% of total output in steady state. The matching technology coefficient is ξ = 8.15 in order to reproduce the 62% relative volatility of US aggregate employment with respect to aggregate output fluctuations as reported in Thomas (2011) . 10 Table 1 . Baseline calibration of model parameters. Sticky-price probability
Baseline calibration
Monetary policy rule µ π = 1.5, µ y = 0.5/4 and µ R = 0.8
Technology shocks
Household preferences are parameterized with a risk aversion coefficient at σ = 1.39 as estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007) in a DSGE model of the US economy. Meanwhile, the curvature parameter on the disutility of labor is set at γ = 2.0 to result in a low Frisch labor supply elasticity (γ −1 = 1/2 = 0.5) as suggested by numerous empirical studies (Altonji, 1986; Card, 1994; Blundell and Macurdy, 1999) . The steady-state quarterly discount factor β = 0.995, which implies a 2%
annualized real interest rate in steady state.
The production function (2) takes the usual capital-share coefficient, α = 0.36, while the laboraugmenting technology shock, z t , is randomly generated by an AR(1) stochastic process with a 95% serial correlation. The standard deviation of the technological innovations is 1.52% to replicate the variability observed in recent fluctuations of US aggregate private employment. 11
Price stickiness is defined by the Calvo probability of non-optimal pricing η = 2/3, so as to have an average frequency of setting optimal prices equal to three quarters, as recently observed in data reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) . 12 The Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity is θ p = 11.0 to 1 1 As documented in Appendix A, the standard deviation of the quarterly series of HP-filtered US Total Private Employment is 1.37% over the sample period 1994:1-2010:4. 1 2 Bils and Klenow (2004) founnd significantly shorter price durations of around 5 months.
imply a 10% mark-up in steady state as suggested by the empirical evidence found by Basu and Fernald (1997) . The Dixit-Stiglitz labor supply elasticity is θ w = 20.0 to render a 5% participation of search costs in the steady-state real marginal cost as in Krause et al. (2008) . 13 Finally, the Taylor-type monetary policy rule is implemented with the original coefficients suggested by Taylor (1993) , µ π = 1.5 and µ y = 0.5/4, together with a rather high interest-rate smoothing coefficient,
Technology shocks and aggregate fluctuations
Solid lines of Figure 
Determinants of firm-level employment dispersion
The employment dispersion across firms is determined in equation (13) where next period's relative employment n t+1 (i) depends upon current inflation and the relative price with constant elasticities τ 1 and −τ 2 . Solving out (14a) and (14b) for the proposed calibration in Table 1 gives rise to the following numbers τ 1 = 0.7842, and τ 2 = 1.1327, which bring a moderate employment inertia (τ 1 = 0.7842), and a substantial dependence of relative prices on next period's employment (τ 2 = 1.1327).
The model can be used to look for the structural determinants of employment dispersion. The unconditional standard deviation of relative employment fluctuations, std( n(i)), provides a direct measure of firm-level employment dispersion. Recalling (13) and Calvo-type staggered pricing, the expression that obtains std( n(i)) is 14
Using the results shown in Woodford's (2003, pages 694-696) , the standard deviation of relative prices can be approximated by the following expression
where std (π) is the standard deviation of economy-wide inflation. Plugging (29) in (28) yields
Under the proposed calibration, I get std( n(i)) = 1.24%. What are the factors behind the firmspecific employment variability? To answer this question, exercises of sensitive analysis can show the effects of altering the parameters of the baseline calibration to see the impact on employment dispersion across firms, measured by std( n(i)). In particular, the following four parameters are examined: the Calvo probability η which represents the degree of price stickiness, the Dixit-Stiglitz labor supply elasticity θ w , the convexity of search costs c 1 , and the Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity, Figure 2 displays the results.
In the top-left plot, it can be observed how firm-level employment dispersion is significantly influenced by the degree of price rigidity. As Calvo probability rises, the standard deviation of firm relative employment increases significantly, moving from less than 0.5% when η = 0.5 to levels close to 10% reached when η is at 0.9. More slowly price adjustments (higher Calvo probability η) result in wider price dispersion across firms (see 29); those firms that have not been able to set the optimal price for many periods must face a larger discrepancy with respect to optimal pricing. In turn, firm-specific employment variability rises with higher price stickiness. If price stickiness turns very severe (as η approaches 1.0) firm-level employment dispersion falls dramatically because std (π) is close to 0 in (30) as very few prices change.
The elasticity of substitution for labor supply allocation, θ w , affects employment dispersion in the opposite direction: if labor supply elasticity is higher any excess demand for firm-specific hours will be absorbed with a more moderate wage rise which buffers the reaction of employment. A rise in labor supply elasticity implies a reduction of τ 2 (with a lower value for θ w in 14b) that has a negative impact on std( n(i)) in (30). Such reduction of firm-level employment dispersion is only noticeable for low elasticities. Figure 2 indicates that std( n(i)) rapidly declines from 1.75% to 1.25%
if the elasticity θ w is raised from 1.0 to 3.0.
The convexity of search costs is quite influential on employment variability across firms. Figure   2 shows, in the bottom-left plot, a reduction in the value of std ( n(i)) from more than 3% to values close to 0% when the curvature of the search cost function is raised from 0.01 to 0.5. Thus, a more costly search process (higher c 1 ) results in less firm-level employment dispersion: if vacancy posting is more expensive the firm will slow down job creation.
Finally, the bottom-right plot of Figure 2 indicates that if demand elasticity rises the variability of firm-specific employment fluctuations increases in a moderate way. This effect is found in the model because a higher Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity would increase the dispersion of firms on demand-determined output (1), total hours (4) and the nominal wage (6). In turn, the sensitivity of relative employment to changes in the relative price is higher. Formally, τ 2 depends positively on θ p as indicated in (14b) and a higher τ 2 raises the measure of employment dispersion, std( n(i)), in (30). In the interval [5, 15] for values assigned to θ p , the observed std( n(i)) goes up from 0.6% to 1.6% as displayed in Figure 2 .
Industry-level employment fluctuations
Let us define one industry as a group of firms. For simplicity, all industries have the same size in our model. There are I industries formed by S firms each, that cover the total number of firms N, which implies N = S * I. Relative employment in the j industry, in t (j) = log
, is defined as the average across the firms that belong to that industry 15
for j = 1, 2, ..., I. Firms are ranked from number 1 to number N, the first set of S firms belong to industry number 1, firms from number 1 + S to number 2S belong to industry 2, firms from number 1 + 2S to number 3S belongs to industry 3, and so forth.
By model assumption, industry-level employment is one-period predetermined alike firm-level employment. Then, relative industry-level employment for period t + 1 is determined in period t by rewriting (31) one period ahead, where inserting the firm-level relationship (13) gives
Relative employment in the j-th industry for next period is explained by the average of current relative employment and current relative prices, across the set of firms that belong to that j industry.
Hence, the outcome of Calvo lotteries determines relative prices and relative employment. If a firm i that belongs to the j industry could set the optimal price, its relative price P t (i) would be the log difference between the optimal price and the aggregate price level, i.e. P t (i) = P * t (i). As shown in Appendix B, the relative optimal price P * t (i) is determined by a forward-looking equation that includes both the expected real marginal costs and expected inflation
If the Calvo-type signal for the i firm that belongs to the j industry did not allow optimal pricing, the firm would have its price stuck to the value from the previous period with the relative price 16
Therefore, Calvo lotteries determine relative price dynamics through either (33a) or (33b). Such relative pricing across firms that belong to the j-th industry can be used in (32). Finally, the dynamic equation for the log fluctuation of industry-level employment is obtained from inserting (32) in the definition in t+1 (j) = in t+1 (j) − n t+1 and solving out for in t+1 (j) to reach
where n t+1 is the log fluctuation of aggregate employment governed by equation (15) of the model.
The business cycle properties of industry-level employment are examined in the model by computing second-moment statistics of volatility, correlation or autocorrelation from simulation exercises.
Artificial series are generated from random draws of a normal distribution with a standard deviation fixed at the calibrated value of 1.52%. These draws provide white-noise innovations, ε t , for the AR (1) technology shocks, z t = 0.95z t−1 + ε t . Total number of firms is set at N = 10, 000 and I assume several (alternative) industrial sizes: S = 1, S = 10, S = 100, S = 1, 000 and S = 10, 000. This is a wide range of industrial size from having single-firm industries (S = 1) to the case in which all firms belong to the same industry (S = N = 10, 000) and industry-level employment coincides with aggregate employment. As discussed above, firms (and industries) are differentiated due to their history of Calvo lotteries. Therefore, 10,000 independent signals are also randomly generated from a [0, 1]
uniform distribution for every sample period. Recalling the baseline Calvo probability (η = 2/3), if the number drawn is higher than 2/3, the firm could price optimally following (33a). Otherwise, the relative price would directly be (33b). Industry-level employment is then computed in (34) It can be observed that the size reduces the standard deviation of industry-level employment. As more firms are included in each industry, the averaging (smoothing) effect on firm-level employment fluctuations makes industry-level employment less volatile. By contrast, the co-movement between industry-level employment and aggregate employment is more intense with a higher industrial size, S. 17 However, even in the limit case of only one firm per industry (S = 1), the correlation coefficient between fluctuations of industry-level employment and output is still moderate at 0.54. Finally, industry-level employment is very persistent at all levels of industrial size. As reported in Table 2 , the coefficient of autocorrelation increases slightly with larger industrial size, and it is close to the 1.0 upper bound in all the cases. US data of industry-level and aggregate employment fluctuations are collected in Appendix A.
The bottom rows of Table 2 and 5% and it diminishes between 0.8% and 1.8% in 10-firm industry-level employment (S = 10).
A larger size of industries (S = 100 or S = 100) brings standard deviations much closer to that of aggregate employment. As for the correlation with aggregate output, the simulations with small industries give a wide range of coefficients of correlation. Some numbers even turn negative when S = 1, whereas industry-level employment shows a strong procyclical co-movement with a large S.
Summarizing, the baseline model is only able to produce industry-level employment volatility observed in recent US data if the number of firms per industry is between 1 and 10. This low volatility might be connected to the fact there is only one source for firm-level employment differentiation: the history of Calvo-style lotteries received by the firms. Next, a second source of differentiation across firms is incorporated to the model: firm-specific technology shocks, with the objective of increasing variability of industry-level employment fluctuations to provide a better fit with the observed volatility in US data. 
Introducing firm-specific technology shocks
The production function of the representative i-th firm (2) can be slightly modified to accommodate a firm-specific labor-augmenting technology shock, z t (i),
The influence of z t (i) on the production capabilities of the firm is transmitted to the demand for total hours, the hours-clearing nominal wage, the quantity of output produced, and the pricing decision.
Hence, combining (2') with the Dixit-Stiglitz demand curve (1), the demand for total hours at the i-th firm would change to
while the hours-clearing nominal wage, W t (i), would also incorporate z t (i) to be
(6') Both the demand for total hours (4') and the nominal wage (6') will have influence in the hiring decision of the firm. A positive relative technology shock raises relative labor productivity, lowers the relative demand for hours (as indicated in 4'), and cuts the relative hours-clearing nominal wage (as indicated in 6'). As shown in the Appendix D, the relative employment dynamics of the representative i-th firm is governed by the following equation
) where z t (i) = z t (i) − z t is the relative technology shock, τ 1 and τ 2 have identical analytical solutions as in the baseline model, τ 3 depends upon the structural parameters as follows:
and ρ z is the coefficient of autocorrelation of firm-specific technology shocks (defined below).
Unlike the baseline model, the presence of firm-specific technology shocks makes the optimal pricing decision be firm specific. Thus, the optimal price will be lower than the average optimal price if the firm-specific technology shock is above the average technology shock. Put differently, a positive firm-specific technology shock reduces the relative wage in (6') and lowers the marginal cost of production which makes the optimal price move downwards. In formal terms, the negative relationship between relative optimal prices and firm-specific technology shocks is collected at the following loglinear expression
where P * t (i) = log
which is comparable to equation (33a) in the baseline model. As also shown in the Appendix D, the analytical solution for τ 4 is
Inserting in (35) and (38) the numerical values of the parameters defined at the baseline calibration (Table 1) and also ρ z = 0.95, it is obtained, τ 3 = 0.0728 and τ 4 = 0.1188; which, as postulated above, indicate a positive elasticity of firm-level employment to its specific technology shock and a negative elasticity of optimal pricing in response to the specific technology shock.
The introduction of firm-specific shocks is made through a generalization of the baseline model described above. For the representative i-th firm, let us take the AR(1) generating process
where ε t (i) is defined as one linear combination between the firm-specific innovation χ t (i) and the economy-wide average innovation 18
with 0 < φ < 1. Redefining the aggregate technology innovation as the average across firm-specific
Setting φ = 0 reduces the model to the case of one economy where all firms receive the same technology innovation, ε t , which recovers the setup described in Section 2 with economy-wide technology shocks. Obviously, there is a connection between firm-specific shocks and aggregate shocks. Since all firm-level innovations are i.i.d. draws, the standard deviation of the economy-wide technology innovation is related to that of the firm-specific innovation as follows
which, as pointed out by Gabaix (2011) , induces a very rapid reduction in aggregate volatility when the number of firms increases. For example, if N = 10, 000 firms and the calibrated volatility of the aggregate innovations is std(ε t ) = 1.52% the required standard deviation of firm-specific innovations is std(ε t (i)) = √ Nstd(ε t ) = 152%.
The value assigned to φ is aimed at fixing the problem of low volatility of industry-level employment in the model. Comin and Philippon (2005) observe that the volatility of firm-level sales growth have been in the US between 5 and 15 times higher than aggregate real GDP volatility. 19 They also report international evidence on the relative volatility of firm-level employment: many countries concentrate around a 10-time factor between firm-level and aggregate employment volatilities.
After some preliminary testing, I set φ = 0.03 to obtain average standard deviations of firm-level employment and output that are not far from 10 times higher than the standard deviations of their respective aggregate fluctuations. 20 Table 3 informs that volatility of both firm-level and industry-level employment rises dramatically with the introduction of calibrated firm-specific technology innovations (φ = 0.03). The average standard deviation of firm-level employment is 10.9%, around 5 times the number found in the model without firm-specific shocks (go to Table 2 Regarding the correlation with output, firm-specific shocks lower the coefficients of cyclical correlation obtained in the baseline model. A moderate industrial size (some number between S = 10 and S = 100) would give the correlation between industry-level employment and output found in US data (0.45). As reported in Table 3 , the cyclical correlation of industry-level employment in the model is 0.32 with S = 10 and 0.68 with S = 100. 21 Finally, the autocorrelation of employment fluctuations is very high (0.99) with any industrial sizes. 
Conclusions
In recent US business cycles, both volatility and cyclical correlation of employment fluctuations decline when aggregating from industry-level to aggregate data. The average standard deviation across industry-level employment has been 1.90%, whereas the standard deviation of aggregate employment is 1.37%. In addition, the correlation between aggregate employment and real GDP is 0.81, while that correlation for industry-level employment falls to 0.45. This paper has presented a calibrated model with heterogeneous labor across firms to examine employment fluctuations at different levels of aggregation.
In the structural analysis, the determinants of firm-level employment dispersion are price stickiness, convexity of search costs for job creation, a low elasticity of substitution in the labor supply, and a high elasticity of substitution in the demand for goods. These factors explain why firm-level volatility of employment is significantly higher than aggregate employment fluctuations. Industrylevel employment is obtained as the average employment in a group of firms. After calibration of parameters, industry-level employment fluctuations are found to be less volatile and more procyclical than in US employment data. Thus, the model is modified to incorporate firm-specific technology shocks in order to increase the average volatility of industry-level employment fluctuations. Simulations with a medium industrial size give a good model fit of volatility, cyclical correlation and persistence of US industry-level employment. Even in the model variant with flexible prices, firm-specific technology shocks bring realistic second-moment patterns of industry-level employment fluctuations, which leaves price stickiness with a minor role for the empirical fit.
Appendix A. US industrial employment data. components of these series were obtained by taking the natural logarithms and running the HP filter. For the cyclical correlation with output, I also used the HP-filtered component of the series of US Real GDP available at St. Louis
Fed website. In the Table, the number in parenthesis after each industry indicates its North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. The column labeled "Weight" provides the coefficient used for the computation of the weighted averages, defined as the ratio of the sample mean of industrial employment over TPE. Appendix B. Derivation of the employment and inflation equations in the baseline model.
The employment equation
Optimality in firm-level hiring decisions is determined by equations (10) and (11), subject to the employment accumulation constraint (7). The substitution of both (11) and the equation correspondent to (11) for period t + 1 in equation (10) yields
which can be loglinearized to reach
where w t+1 = W t+1 − P t+1 . Meanwhile, taking logs in (6) and subtracting the log of the aggregate nominal wage yields
where W t (i) = log
and P t (i) = log
respectively are relative wages and prices. Similarly, taking logs in (4) and subtracting the log of aggregate total hours leads to the following (log of) demand for hours depending on relative employment and relative prices
Moving (B4) and (B3) one period forward leads to expressions for E t h d t+1 (i) and E t W t+1 (i) such as
, and
which can be inserted in the loglinear optimality condition (B2) to obtain
Log deviations of firm-specific current vacancies, v t (i), can be obtained by loglinearizing (7) rearranging terms, as follows
Both (B6) and its corresponding expression one period ahead for E t v t+1 (i) are substituted in (B5) to obtain
which is equivalent to
The result obtained in (B7) implies a certain relationship between firm-specific employment and pricing of the following kind
where τ 1 and τ 2 are undetermined coefficients to be found below. Using (B8) to infer E t n t+2 (i), it is obtained
which after being plugged in (B7) results in
Moreover, the Calvo-style pricing scheme implies that the expected relative price E t P t+1 (i) is calculated as a weighted average between the current price and the expected optimal price
Calvo pricing also implies P * t (i) = η 1−η π t and, subsequently, E t P * t+1 (i) = η 1−η E t π t+1 that can be used in (B10) to yield
which it is inserted in (B9) to obtain
The aggregation of (B11) over the continuum of firms leads to the macro relationship that determines employment fluctuations
which is equation (15) in the main text. Another consequence of (B11) is that the analytical expressions for the undetermined coefficients τ 1 and τ 2 , consistent with the assumed relationship (B8),
, that respectively become expressions (14a) and (14b) in the main text.
The inflation equation
I start by making a log-linear approximation to the price setting equation (12) that renders
where log deviations from steady state of firm-specific real marginal costs can be obtained from (9) as follows
Subtracting log deviations of the aggregate real marginal cost,
where using (B3) for W t+k (i), the log-linear version of (1) for y t+k (i), and (B4) for h d t+k (i), I get
Inserting (B14) in (B12), it is obtained
where subtracting the log of the aggregate price level, P t , on both sides of the equation, I reach
The rational expectation of future relative prices, conditional to optimal pricing in t and the lack of optimal price adjustments in the future, is
Combining (B16) with P * t (i) = η 1−η π t from the Calvo pricing scheme leads to
where one can do π t −βηE t π t+1 to reach the New Keynesian Phillips curve (16) that governs inflation
Appendix C. Derivation of the standard deviation of firm-specific relative employment.
From the dynamic evolution of relative employment, n t+1 (i) = τ 1 n t (i) − τ 2 P t (i), the variance of relative employment is
The covariance between relative employment and the relative price is the expected product of relative employment times the relative price
where the relative price is obtained as a weighted average between lagged relative prices (adjusted by current inflation) and the optimal relative price
Combining the last two expressions and recalling the Calvo-style pricing to use P * t (i) =
Lagging the dynamic equation on relative employment, n t (i) = τ 1 n t−1 (i) − τ 2 P t−1 (i), and using
where I can use E P −1 (i) 2 = var P (i) , and E n −1 (i) · P −1 (i) = cov( n(i), P (i)) to reach cov( n(i), P (i)) = ητ 1 cov( n(i), P (i)) − ητ 2 var P (i) .
Solving the last expression for cov( n(i), P (i)), it is obtained
and substituting the result in the expression for var( n(i)) that is displayed above gives
where taking the square root leads to the expression for the standard deviation of relative employment Firm-specific employment dynamics are governed by the loglinearized equation that determines optimal hiring, which was displayed above as equation (A2)
Remarkably, the introduction of firm-specific technology shocks has an influence on firm-specific employment through the impact on both expected wages and hours of the firm. Taking logs in (4') and subtracting the log of aggregate demand for total hours results in the following expression for the relative demand for hours in the i-th firm
where z t (i) = z t (i) − z t . The labor-clearing relative nominal wage, W t (i), would also incorporate z t (i) from a log-linear approximation to (6') that gives
Both (D2) and (D3) can be written for period t + 1 and substituted in (D1) to obtain
where ρ z is the coefficient of autocorrelation of the AR(1) technology shocks. Using in (D4),
, and the corresponding expression for v t+1 (i) yields
The relationship between firm-specific employment, firm-specific prices and firm-specific technology shocks is assumed to be of this type n t+1 (i) = τ 1 n t (i) − τ 2 P t (i) + τ 3 z t (i).
Using (D6) to infer E t n t+2 (i), it is obtained E t n t+2 (i) = τ 1 n t+1 (i) − τ 2 E t P t+1 (i) + τ 3 ρ z z t (i), 
The optimal price is firm-specific (and therefore it needs aggregation for computing the average) due to different technology shocks received at each firm. In particular, it is initially assumed that relative optimal pricing is negatively relative to technology shocks through their impact on wages (see D3) and marginal costs
which implies that the relative optimal price expected for next period is E t P * t+1 (i) = E t P * t+1 − τ 4 ρ z z t (i) and the expected relative price E t P t+1 (i) that appears in (D7) is E t P t+1 (i) = η (log P t (i) − E t log P t+1 ) + (1 − η)E t P * t+1 (i) = η P t (i) − E t π t+1 + (1 − η) E t P * t+1 − τ 4 ρ z z t (i) , (D9) where E t π t+1 = E t log P t+1 − log P t is expected next period's inflation. Calvo pricing implies P * t = η 1−η π t and, subsequently, E t P * t+1 = η 1−η E t π t+1 that can be used in (D9) to yield
which it is inserted in (D7) to obtain − 1 + 
The rational expectation of the steam of future relative prices, conditional to optimal pricing in t and the lack of optimal price adjustments in the future, is E η P t + P t − E t P t+k = P * t (i) − E t k x=1 π t+x = P * t (i) − E t j k=1 π t+k . Using this result, (D14 Recalling the proposed relation for optimal price dynamics, P * t (i) = P * t − τ 4 z t (i), the analytical solutions for τ 4 consistent with the last equation is 
Combining (D15) with P * t = η 1−η π t from the Calvo scheme leads to
where one can do π t −βηE t π t+1 to reach the identical New Keynesian Phillips curve to that obtained in the model with economy-wide technology shocks π t = βE t π t+1 +
(1−βη)(1−η) η 1+ θp(θ −1 w +α) 1−α ψ t .
